Indonesian navy vessels at dock, Natuna Island.
Image Credit: Victor Robert Lee
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The country’s
defense minister says it will strengthen its air defenses “to be prepared.”
Earlier
this week, the Indonesian defense minister said that the country would boost
its defenses near the South China Sea in anticipation of future threats.
Defense
Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu said that Indonesia will equip the Natuna islands
near the South China Sea with a port and extend its military air base runway so
that it can accommodate more planes. He also added that more jet fighters would
be stationed at the Ranai military air base in Natuna.
“We
are not in a war situation, but the South China Sea is very close to us,”
Ryamizard added. “We have to be prepared. Our weapon systems are
good, but we need to add more so that we don’t need to worry all the time.”
To
close observers, Ryamizard’s comments are consistent with Indonesia’s general
approach to South China Sea disputes. As I have written before, while Indonesia
is not a claimant, Jakarta has long been concerned that a portion of the
surrounding waters of its resource-rich Natuna islands overlaps with China’s
expansive nine-dash line claim (See: “Natuna is Indonesian, Not Chinese: Jokowi Adviser”).
In
response, since the 1990s Indonesia has been using a mix of diplomatic, legal,
and security measures to fashion a delicate approach to oppose China’s claims
without officially recognizing (and thus legitimizing) them (See: “No, Indonesia’s South China Sea Approach Has Not Changed”).
Within this approach, the South China Sea – and the Natunas, in particular –
have been a central feature in Indonesian defense thinking. For instance, the
Natunas have been included as one of the main flashpoints to watch since the
2000s as the Indonesian military (TNI) works towards achieving a Minimum Essential
Force by 2024 (See: “Between Aspiration and Reality: Indonesian Foreign Policy After
the 2014 Elections”).
Even
before President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo took power, China’s growing assertiveness
– which has included encroachments into Indonesian waters and instances of
direct confrontation – has prompted Indonesian military officials to be more
outspoken about the South China Sea issue and led to several announced shifts
in capabilities including in the Natuna Islands. In February 2014, during a
visit to China, then TNI chief General Moeldoko announced that Indonesia would
station additional forces around the Natuna waters to “anticipate any
instability.” In March, Indonesian Army Chief of Staff General Budiman
announced that Indonesia would upgrade its airbase facilities with the
long-term goal of permanently deploying a squadron of Sukhoi fighter aircraft
and four Boeing AH-64E Apache attack helicopters on the Natuna Islands.
Under
Jokowi, Indonesia has continued to focus on the Natunas as part of its foreign
policy priorities of preserving Indonesia’s sovereignty and strengthening its
maritime capabilities (See: “The Trouble With Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Priorities Under
Jokowi”). To take just one example, earlier this year, the Natunas were
selected as one of several potential locations for a new military base –
although, as I indicated then, that development stemmed from a broader concern
about threats to border areas which come not only from China, but some of
Jakarta’s other neighbors too (See: “A New Indonesia Military Base Near the South China Sea?”).
Just last week, Indonesia’s Navy Chief of Staff Adm. Ade Supandi said that
Indonesia needed to maintain security and stability in the South China Sea in
the face of rising threats.
“[We
should] maintain security and stability in the South China Sea, especially with
the recently increasing intensity of threats,” Supandi said.
Ryamizard’s
comments suggest that these upgrades are likely to proceed as planned under
Jokowi’s tenure and that Jakarta continues to see the South China Sea as one of
the key security challenges it needs to be concerned about.
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